DOCUMNT2

2.1 — Irena Hollowell
2.2 — Johannes Wilke
2.3 — Hanne Lippard
2.4 — Ella Coon
2.5 — aaaaarg.fail
2.6 — Hito Steyerl
2.7 — Renata Adler
2.8 — Grischa Lichtenberger
2.9 — Nico Jungel
      — burgund t brandt
2.10 — Daniel Temkin
2.11 — Anna Erdmann
2.12 — Anja Kaiser
2.13 — Experimental Jetset
2.14 — Jake Reber
2.15 — Ewa Wójtowicz
        — Inside Job
2.16 — Sarah Newman
        — Jessica Yurkofsky
        — Rachel Kalmar
2.17 — Malin Gewinner
        — Matt Arnold
2.18 — Lynne Huffer
2.19 — Mark Lecky
2.20 — Bios


DOCUMNT1 (PDF, DOC)

1.1 — Documnt wants to be free
1.2 — Mirjam Kroker
1.3 — Simon Roloff
1.4 — Diana Ludzay
1.5 — Joeun Aatchim
1.6 — Karl Holmqvist
      — Karl Holmqvist
1.7 — Lars TCF Holdhus
1.8 — N. Katherine Hayles
1.9 — Bisera Krckovska
1.10 — Hervé All
1.11 — Jacques Rancière
1.12 — Steve Rosenthal
1.13 — Adrien Da Silva
1.14 — Tinna Siradze
1.15 — Kurt Eidsvig
1.16 — Katarina Henriksson
1.17 — Wisława Szymborska
1.18 — Bryony Gillard
1.19 — R. Prost


1.8

What are we to make, then, of the posthuman? As the liberal humanist subject is dismantled, many parties are contesting to determine what will count as (post)human in its wake. For most of the researchers discussed in this chapter, becoming a posthuman means much more than having prosthetic devices grafted onto one’s body. It means envisioning humans as information-processing machines with fundamental similarities to other kinds of information-processing machines, especially intelligent computers. Because of how information has been defined, many people holding this view tend to put materiality on one side of a divide and information on the other side, making it possible to think of information as a kind of immaterial fluid that circulates effortlessly around the globe while still retaining the solidity of a reified concept. Yet this is not the only view, and in my judgment, it is not the most compelling one. Other voices insist that the body cannot be left behind, that the specificities of embodiment matter, that mind and body are finally the “unity” that Maturana insisted on rather than two separate entities. Increasingly the question is not whether we will become posthuman, for posthumanity is already here. Rather, the question is what kind of posthumans we will be. The narratives of Artificial Life reveal that if we acknowledge that the observer must be part of the picture, bodies can never be made of information alone, no matter which side of the computer screen they are on.


— N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press), 1999.